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RECENT DECISIONS

Res ipsa loquitur-Application to exploding-bottle cases-Plaintiff was employed as a waitress in a store to which defendant sold and
delivered Coca Cola. As plaintiff reached for a bottle to serve a customer, it exploded and caused injury to her hand. Lower court found
for the defendant. Held: Reversed. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine
could be applied in the court's charge to the jury upon the theory that
the defendant had control of the bottle at the time of the alleged negligent act although not at the time of the accident. However, the plaintiff
would have to prove first that the condition of the bottle or container
had not been changed after it left defendant's possession, that the plaintiff had handled the bottle carefully, and that the injury was not due to
any voluntary action on her part. Johnson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
Willniar,51 N.W. 2d 573 (Minn., 1952).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is well established in American
courts3, It was first declared by Chief Justice Erle in Scott v. London
2
Dock Co.:
"There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But
where the thing is shown to be under the management and control of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the
accident arose from want of care."
* Chief Justice Erle's statement of the doctrine does not lend itself
easily 'to the needs of an injured plaintiff in most exploding-bottle cases
because the requirement of "control" has been interpreted to mean that
the defendant owned, operated, and maintained, or controlled and was
exclusively responsible for the management and maintenance of, the
thing doing the damage. 3 The efforts by the courts to apply the doctrine to such cases has given rise to the modem or liberal interpretation
of the rule; of which the decision in the principal case is a typical example.
'-The term "control," as defined by-the liberal rule, means that the
defndant had control of the physical cause of the injury, not at the time
of the injury, but at the time of the alleged negligent act. 4 This view,
first declared in Payne v. Rome Coca Cola Bottling Co., 5 has extended
I IX Wigmore, Evidence §2509,' N. 3 (3rd ed. 1940) ; Carpenter, The Doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquztur (1934) 1 U. OF CHL L. REV. 519; PRossE, ToRTs (1941)
295.
2 3 H & C 596 (1865).
3 WIMORE, supra, note 1; Winfree v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 19 Tenn.
App. 144, 83 S.W. 2d 903 (1935; Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn.
44, 15 A. 2d 181 (1940).
4 Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497, 39 A.L.R. 1001,
(1925) ; Macres v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 290 Mich. 567, 827 N.W. 922
(1939).
5 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

the meaning of the term "control" in order that the doctrine might be
made available to an otherwise thwarted plaintiff, for in the great majority of cases, the bottle has passed out of the control of the defendant
before the injury occurs.
This modern extension of the term "control" contains a fundamental error in logic in that it beggs the question. Unless the physical
cause of the explosion were known, it could not be said that the defendant had control at the time of the negligent act, for it was not
possible to know whether an act of the defendant caused it. In this
way, a physical cause for which the defendant would be liable is being
inferred when there are other causes just as reasonable for which defendant would not be held liable (e.g., a latent defect, an unavoidable
accident, or an unknown external force). If it were not an act on the
part of the defendant that gave rise to the physical cause of the explosion, it could not have happened while in his possession and control.
Thus, by using in the premises the thing to be proved (i.e. the conclusion), the circle is completely formed.
The only way to avoid this error in logic is to say that from the mere
fact of the explosion itself negligence must necessarily and absolutely
6
be inferred. And that is precisely the reasoning of the liberal courts.
By necessarily inferring negligence from the mere happening of the explosion, as an unusual occurrence, the liberal courts have located the
fault by allowing all handlers prior to and including the plaintiff to
show that they have not caused the explosion since it left the control of
the defendant.7 By excluding all other possible inferences as to the
cause of the explosion, including the possible negligence of the plaintiff
and other non-actionable causes, they have literally "pinned" liability
on the defendant by applying the res ipsa loquitur rule.
It is at once apparent that this is an unwarranted extension of that
doctrine for it was intended to be used only when negligence is the only
inference which can be drawn from the accident.8 In a case where
management and control of the instrumentality are divided between
two or among several persons, plaintiff, by proving due care on the part
of all but the single defendant, should not then be allowed to invoke the
res ipsa loquitur rule which would not have had application in the first
place. 9 Such an application of the rule has the effect of making the
bottler or manufacturer an insurer of his products notwithstanding the
6 Ibid. at 1088. "The bottle exploded. Inferentially someone was negligent."
7
Principal case, 51 N.W. 2d 573; Payne v. Rome Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
supra, note 5.
8 Chennal v. Palmer B. Co., 117 Ga. 106, 43 S.E. 443 (1903).
9 Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 2d 674, 129 P. 2d 485 (1942).
10
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944), (Dissenting opinion). "It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of
recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence."
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insistence of the courts that liability is upon the grounds of negligence."
However, as has been intimated, there is another conservative view, 1
announced in the leading case of Slack v. Premier-PabstCorp.,1 2 where
it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "is not applied except
where the transaction was in the exclusive management of the defendant, and all the elements of the occurrence within his control, and
the result is so unaccountable that the defendant's negligence as a proximate cause of injury is the only fair inference to be drawn from the
circumstances."
In addition to the fact that this court adopts the original meaning of
the term "control," it has declared that it does not consider the explosion of a bottle of carbonated beverage so unusual as to absolutely infer
someone's negligence.13 In the case of Stewart v. Crystal Coca Cola
Bottling Co.,14 examples of other possible inferences were given and
approved by the Slack court. There it was pointed out that it was no
more reasonable to infer that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the explosion than that it was either (1) a latent defect,
(2) an unavoidable accident or, (3) caused by an unknown external
force after the defendant had lost control of the bottle.
However, the Slack case rule would not, always, deny relief to a
plaintiff. It recognized that in some cases circumstantial evidence, for
example, tthe explosions of many bottles of the product manufactured
by the defendant,' 5 might well take the inference of the defendant's
negligence out of the realm of mere surmise or conjecture. This circumstantial evidence would not prove negligence, but would supply an
inference of negligence in order to make the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applicable.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not decided an "exploding
bottle" case. It has however, applied the res ipsa loquitur rule holding
that its application creates a permissible inference of negligence for the
jury.1 6 Although approving the rule, Wisconsin has not applied it too
frequently holding to the principle that the character of the accident,
rather than the fact of the of the accident, determines whether the doctrine is applicable. Hence, the courts of Wisconsin have denied its application where no direct evidence of how such an accident occurred is
For an enumeration of cases holding both views, see the principal case. For
an excellent discussion, comparison, and evaluation of both views, see §16
Ins. L.J., 331-42 (1949).
12 1 Terry 97, 40 Del. 97, 5 A. 2d 516 (1939).
13 Ibid. at 519. "It will not do, we think, to say that as the bottle exploded,
1"

inferentially someone was negligent."

Ariz. 60, 68 P. 2d 592 (1937).
Dail v. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135 (1909); Coca Cola Bottling Works
v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 718 (1926).

14
50
5

'1

26 Kaples v. Orth, 61 Wis. 531, 21 N.W. 633 (1884); Klitzske v. Webb, 120 Wis.

254, 97 N.W. 901 (1904); Rost v. Roberts, 180 Wis. 207, 192 N.W. 38 (1923).
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shown, and the facts indicate that it may as readily be ascribed to a nonactionable as well as an actionable cause, holding that it is not within
the proper province of a jury to guess where the truth lies and make
that the foundation for a verdict.'7
In view of the fact that both the language and the reasoning of the
Wisconsin cases in applying or refusing to apply the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine bear a striking resemblance to that of the Slack case,' 8 there is
good reason to believe that tie Wisconsin court may follow the conservative view if called upon in the future to decide an "exploding bottle" case.
However, what the final accepted shape of the rule will be can
hardly be predicted. The reasoning 'of the Slack case, requiring "control" to mean that both inspection and user must have been at the time
of the 'injury in the exclusive control of the party charged, and stating
that the mere fact that a bottle exploded does not necessarily compel an
inference of negligence, would seem to be the more logical law.
Whther its application effects the most desirable results is obviously
open to question in' view of the modern tendency to extend the rule in
order to afford relief to an injured plaintiff rather than to the defendant,
who is usually better able to sustain the loss. But the question of who
should bear the loss would seem to be one of policy to be decided by
tthe legislature -rather than by the courts. 9
0.

MICHAEL BONAHOOM

Landlord and Tenant-Right of One to Contribution or Indemnity Against the Other Where a Covenant to Maintain and Repair the Premises is Breached-Action commenced by Hardware
Mutual Casualty Co. (subrogee of insured lessor) against the defendant lessee, to recover contribution of 50% of the amount which plaintiff paid lone Vorek and her husband' in settlement of claims for injuries caused by the negligently defective' condition of the entranceways
and stairs and which were received by her while in defendant's drug
store to purchase merchandise. Defendant appealed from an order
overruling demurrer to complaint. Held: Affirmed. The complaint has
stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for contribution.
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rasmussen Drug Co., 261 Wis. 1,
51 N.W. 2d 551 (1952).
Hyer v. City of Janesville, 101 Wis. 371, 77 N.W. 729 (1898).
Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 285, 172 N.W. 736 (1919); Jensen v. Jensen, 228
Wis. 77, 279 N.W. 628 (1938) ; Koehler v. Theinsville State Bank, 245 Wis.
281, 14 N.W. 2d 15 (1944); Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Matson, 256 Wis.
304 41 N.W. 2d 268 (1950).
9 Ins. L. J., supra note 11.
'WIs. STATS, (1949), sec. 101.01, 101.06.
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